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Abstract. This study investigates the determinants of corporate capital structure of various sectors in the 
Bursa Malaysia Main Market with the aim to establish whether the determinants of capital structure 
can be explained by either the trade-off or the pecking order theory. This study also examines whether 
there are any differences between the regressions for any two sectors or not. This study applies both the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimators to estimate 
the leverage models, and subsequently determines the efficiency of each estimator. The results indicate 
that profitability, asset tangibility, growth opportunities, and firm size are important determinants of 
corporate capital structure. However, the signs of the regression coefficients suggest that the trade-off 
and pecking order theories are complementary. Moreover, the importance of some of these determinants 
differs across sectors. In most cases of the regression analyses between two sectors, the SUR estimator is 
found to be more efficient in explaining the determinants of capital structure among the various sectors. 
Hence, this study concludes that the SUR method could serve as a useful alternative methodology for 
capital structure research. 
Keywords: capital structure; leverage; seemingly unrelated regression; sectoral analysis; Bursa Malaysia
1. Introduction
In their seminal work, Modigliani and Miller (1958) introduce the irrelevance theorem, 
which postulates that in perfect capital markets, the firm’s leverage1 should not have any 
effect on its market value and capital investment plans since both real and financial deci-
1 The terms “capital structure” and “leverage” are applied interchangeably in this paper.
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sions can be made separately. In other words, when there are no frictions such as agency 
costs, asymmetric information, taxes, and bankruptcy costs, the firm’s capital structure 
is irrelevant to its value. Numerous studies have been carried out since then to further 
understand the financing decisions of firms, and some recent empirical studies on capi-
tal structure determinants have produced contrary evidence. Most of the empirical evi-
dence suggests that firms use some cost-benefit analysis to choose their capital structure. 
The primary aim of this paper is to examine the determinants of corporate capital 
structure of various sectors in the Bursa Malaysia Main Market. The majority of capital 
structure studies are confined to country level or firm level analysis. However, limited 
studies are done for multi-sectors or multi-industries, particularly in relation to the Ma-
laysian market (e.g., Lau et al., 2016a, 2016b; Ramakrishnan, 2012). This study aims 
to investigate whether the capital structure determinants are explained by either the 
trade-off or the pecking order theory. This study hypothesizes that both the trade-off 
and pecking order theories are complementary, rather than one theory being more su-
perior than the other. The second aim of this paper is to investigate whether there are 
any differences between the regressions for any two sectors or not. If there are no differ-
ences, then the data from the two sectors can be pooled together without any parameter 
restrictions and with no allowance being made for differing intercept or slope. 
In order to achieve these objectives, this study applies both the OLS and SUR es-
timators to estimate the capital structure determinants of various sectors in Malaysia.2 
The SUR model is especially useful for testing the properties of homogeneity and sym-
metry. Therefore, it would be interesting to see whether this estimator is more efficient 
in explaining the capital structure determinants among the various sectors. This study 
covers seven sectors in the Bursa Malaysia Main Market, namely consumer products, 
industrial products, construction, trading services, properties, plantation, and technol-
ogy from 2000 to 2014, yielding 105 sector-year observations. The results support the 
hypothesis of this study and are in line with prior findings by Ebrahim et al. (2014), 
González and González (2012), and Mukherjee and Mahakud (2012) that the trade-
off and pecking order theories are complementary. However, some of the determinants 
of capital structure differ across sectors. In addition, based on the Breusch and Pagan 
(1980) Lagrange Multiplier (Breusch-Pagan LM) test, the SUR estimator is found to 
be a more efficient estimator for the regression models involving 17 out of 21 combina-
tions between two sectors. Nonetheless, the results based on the Wald test are mixed.
The contribution of this paper is that it allows us to have a better comprehension 
of what factors influence the capital structure of different sectors. This is important at 
the policy makers’ level because it enables the monetary authorities and financial poli-
cy makers to introduce the appropriate policies and financial instruments to fulfill the 
2 The OLS and SUR methods have been adopted to test the association between variables in numerous 
empirical studies (e.g., see Al-Dhamari & Ku Ismail, 2014; Cadavez & Henningsen, 2012; Keshavarzi et al., 
2012; Bhaird & Lucey, 2010). Moreover, past capital structure research has widely adopted the OLS method 
to find the determinants of corporate capital structure (e.g., see Shen, 2014; De Jong et al., 2010). 
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funding needs of various sectors in the economy. This may also assist lenders and other 
financial institutions in aligning their lending decisions with the capital structure choic-
es of firms from different sectors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the litera-
ture. Section three explains the methodology. Section four describes the data. Section 
five presents the empirical results. Section six covers the robustness checks, and section 
seven concludes.
2. Literature Review
The debate on capital structure originates from the capital structure irrelevance theo-
rem by Modigliani and Miller (1958), which postulates that in perfect capital markets, 
i.e., where there are no frictions such as agency costs, asymmetric information, taxes, 
and bankruptcy costs, the capital structure of a firm is irrelevant. Therefore, a firm’s 
leverage should not have any effect on its market value and capital investment plans. 
Since then, several theories on capital structure have emerged, which attempt to iden-
tify which frictions make capital structure relevant to the firms and their implications. 
There are two major competing theories in modern corporate finance literature which 
attempt to explain the firm’s financing decisions, namely the trade-off theory and the 
pecking order theory. 
The trade-off theory is one of the most accepted theories of corporate capital struc-
ture. According to this theory, firms select their optimal capital structure after consider-
ing the trade-off between the benefits and costs of using debt. The imperfections to be 
taken into consideration include the costs of financial distress, taxes, and agency costs. 
For instance, higher financial distress costs lead to less debt and more equity (Myers, 
1977), higher taxes on dividend lead to more debt (Miller & Scholes, 1978; Modigliani 
& Miller, 1963), higher non-debt tax shields lead to less debt (DeAngelo & Masulis, 
1980), excessive debt can result in conflicts of interest and asset substitution problems 
between managers and bondholders ( Jensen & Mecking, 1976; Fama & Miller, 1972), 
agency problems can result in higher or lower amount of debt, and excessive equity can 
result in free cash flow problems and conflicts of interest between managers and share-
holders ( Jensen, 1986). 
There are recent empirical findings supporting the existence of a target leverage ra-
tio and firms reverting back to a target capital structure after perturbations or random 
events. For instance, Chong and Law (2012) analyzed the long-run adjustment of capi-
tal structure towards the target for a sample of industrial firms in five Asian economies, 
namely Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, and Taiwan, for the period 1980 to 
2003. The results indicate that although there are significant deviations from the target 
due to the pecking order and market timing effects, the leverage ratios of these Asian 
firms revert gradually to the target leverage ratio to fill up the leverage deficit. Mean-
while, Dang et al. (2014) investigated the impact of the Global Financial Crisis and the 
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associated credit shocks on the leverage adjustment speed for a sample of U.S. firms 
over the period 2002 to 2012. The authors find limited evidence of threshold effects 
and asymmetric speed of adjustment when the analysis is done for the whole sample 
period. However, when the authors conduct sub-period analyses, they find stronger 
cross-sectional heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment, with the most pronounced 
results recorded for the pre-crisis period. Other empirical studies which find evidence 
supporting the existence of a target leverage ratio are Versmissen and Zietz (2017), 
Cook et al. (2016), and González and González (2012).
Meanwhile, Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) propose the pecking or-
der theory, which postulates that firms have no well-defined target debt ratio. Instead, 
firms’ preferences are described in a theoretical model where the firms’ capital struc-
ture choice follows a strict hierarchy, where they prefer internal funding the most, and 
they will issue debt when the internal funding is insufficient to finance their investment. 
Firms shall only consider issuing equity when they can no longer issue debt due to the 
risk of default or other financial distress costs. The justification behind the pecking 
order in capital structure choices is the presence of asymmetric information between 
the firm’s managers and outside investors, where managers are assumed to have more 
information about the firm’s value compared to potential investors.3 When managers 
believe that their shares are undervalued, they are reluctant to issue new shares even 
if it means that they have to forgo valuable investment opportunities. Investors know 
about this information asymmetry and interpret the actions of the firm rationally. As a 
result, investors perceive an investment decision with no security issuance as a signal 
for good news, and equity issuance as a signal for bad news. The latter signal causes a 
reduction in the price investors are willing to pay for the equity issue. Faced with the 
reality of this discount, firms adopt a pecking order of firm’s financing, where managers 
prefer using internally generated sources of funds first, then debt, and finally, equity, if 
external financing is needed. 
The empirical investigation of the pecking order theory involves two major notions. 
The first one is financing deficit, or a financing gap, which is defined as the difference 
between investment and internal funding. For example, De Jong et al. (2010) modify 
the pecking order model of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) by discriminating be-
tween the effects of financing surpluses, normal deficits, and large deficits. The authors 
report that for financing surpluses, the pecking order model is a good descriptor of the 
financing behaviour of firms. Nonetheless, the pecking order model only provides a rea-
sonable description for small and medium financing deficits, and an extremely poor de-
scription for large financing deficits. This implies that firms facing large deficits, which 
are normally associated with small firms, issue relatively more equity than debt.
3 Besides asymmetric information, it has been shown that the pecking order theory can also be generated by 
other imperfections. For instance, firms may prefer debt to equity due to corporate taxes (Stiglitz, 1973), 
agency costs or incentive conflicts ( Jensen & Meckling, 1976), transaction costs (Altinkiliç & Hansen, 2000), 
or excessive managerial optimism (Baker et al., 2007). 
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The second important notion in the empirical investigation of the pecking order 
theory is debt capacity. Debt capacity can be broadly defined as the maximum amount 
of debt that a firm can borrow. For instance, Lemmon and Zender (2010) consider 
the heterogeneity in the debt capacity level of various firms in their capital structure 
study. The authors find that firms which are unconstrained by debt capacity rely on dif-
ferent sources of external funding compared to firms with limited debt capacity when 
they face large financing deficits. More specifically, firms which are unconstrained by 
concerns over debt capacity tend to issue debt, while firms with limited debt capacity 
rely more on outside equity, hence violating the pecking order. In the same vein, Shen 
(2014) also emphasizes the role of debt capacity, where firms that violate the pecking 
order theory often have limited access to the public debt market. The author finds it 
puzzling for firms with high information asymmetry to have moderate dependence on 
debt financing since such firms are supposed to demonstrate a strong preference for 
debt financing given the relatively expensive equity capital. He  shows that this puzzling 
finding can be explained by the constraints faced by high-information-asymmetry firms 
in the public debt market, where as information asymmetry increases, firms have in-
creasing desire to issue debt but are constrained from doing so since they begin to lose 
access to the public debt market. Consequently, these firms have to resort to issuing 
private debt and face the relatively low debt capacities found in the private debt market.
In conclusion, there is no single theory of capital structure that can fully explain the 
cross-sectional and time series patterns observed in the literature (Chang & Dasgupta, 
2011; Graham & Leary, 2011). There is a variation in the relative importance of these 
explanations in different studies. This paper focuses primarily on the two major com-
peting theories, namely the trade-off and the pecking order theories. 
3. Methodology
Equation 1 shows the leverage model used in this paper4:
LEVi,t = β1 + β2PROFITi,t + β3TANGIi,t + β4GROWTHi,t + β5SIZEi,t + εi.t  (1)
where subscript i indexes the sector and t indexes the year.
The dependent variable is book leverage ratio (LEV), which is measured as the ra-
tio of the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets. The stud-
ies which have adopted similar definitions of book leverage ratio include Chow et al. 
(2018) and Canarella et al. (2014). 
The choice of regressors used in this paper is similar to those found in prior capital 
structure research. PROFIT measures the overall profitability of the given sector, which 
4 The leverage model is tested in its linear form. Preliminary data analyses did not detect the presence of non-
linearities in the data.
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is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (Li & Islam, 
2019; Sun et al., 2015). According to the trade-off theory, there is a positive relation-
ship between leverage and profitability since more profitable firms have less probabili-
ty of financial distress. Additionally, more profitable firms also have higher leverage to 
control the agency cost of free cash flow and to shield taxable income (Hart & Moore, 
1995; Jensen, 1986). On the contrary, the pecking order model predicts an inverse as-
sociation between profitability and leverage. More profitable firms prefer less leverage 
and rely more on retained earnings due to adverse selection and information asymme-
try problems (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984).
TANGI measures the tangibility of assets, which is calculated as the ratio of net val-
ues of property, plant, and equipment to total assets (Li & Islam, 2019; Nugroho & Suk, 
2019). According to the trade-off theory, there is a positive association between asset 
tangibility and leverage. Higher asset tangibility means that firms possess more fixed as-
sets that can be given as collateral for loans. As such, lenders face lower risk when giving 
loans to these firms. Moreover, tangibility makes it more difficult for shareholders to 
substitute high-risk assets for low-risk ones. As a result, firms with more tangible assets 
can obtain debt financing with greater ease.5 There is, however, ambiguity regarding the 
relationship between asset tangibility and firm leverage under the pecking order theory. 
On one hand, firms with few tangible assets are expected to have more problems with 
information asymmetry. As such, these firms tend to use more debt over time (Har-
ris & Raviv, 1991). On the other hand, adverse selection problem increases with asset 
tangibility and results in higher leverage. According to Frank and Goyal (2009), this 
ambiguity arises because asset tangibility acts as a proxy for different forces of economy.
GROWTH denotes growth opportunities and is measured using the market-to-
book ratio, computed as the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value 
of debt to total assets (Nugroho & Suk, 2019; Ebrahim et al., 2014). The trade-off theo-
ry predicts that the association between growth opportunities and leverage is negative. 
Higher market-to-book ratio may be perceived as an indication of better future invest-
ment opportunities. Firms may attempt to protect these future investment opportuni-
ties by restraining the use of leverage now. On the flip side, according to the pecking 
order theory, there is a positive relation between growth opportunities and leverage 
because higher financing needs arise due to investment opportunities, and this will lead 
to more debt issuance.
SIZE is meant to illustrate the magnitude of the representative company’s opera-
tions. It is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (Chow et al., 2018; Ebrahim 
et al., 2014). According to the trade-off theory, it is predicted that firm size has a posi-
tive relationship with leverage because larger firms are more diversified and face lower 
5 This also implies that firms with fewer tangible assets would face more difficulties in obtaining debt financing. 
Empirically, it has been shown that firms with fewer tangible assets (e.g., firms operating in the technology 
sector) have lower leverage ratios (e.g., Li & Islam, 2019), which is in support of the trade-off theory.
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chances of bankruptcy. Moreover, these firms have greater bargaining power in the debt 
markets due to their good reputation and business track records. However, the pecking 
order theory predicts a negative association between leverage and firm size. Assuming 
that firm size is a reasonable proxy for firm age, large firms are assumed to have been op-
erating for a longer period and are better known. Consequently, large firms encounter 
lower adverse selection problems and find it relatively easy to issue equity compared to 
small firms which are often shrouded by more severe adverse selection problems (Ebra-
him et al., 2014).6 Finally, εi.t  denotes the error term.
This study uses both the OLS and SUR estimators to estimate the leverage model, 
and subsequently determines the efficiency of each estimator. The OLS estimator fails 
to consider the possible correlation between equations, where it assumes that the error 
terms are not correlated. The SUR estimator developed by Zellner (1962) considers 
the correlations in the error terms and allows for different dependent variables to have 
different sets of regressors. The SUR method simultaneously estimates the parameter 
of all equations so that the parameters of each equation also utilise the information 
provided by other equations. Hence, the estimation is more efficient since it combines 
information on different equations. 
Initially, this study estimates the leverage model for all seven sectors using both the 
OLS and SUR estimators. In order to account for cross-sector differences in the OLS 
regression, this study has incorporated sector dummies into the analysis. For diagnostic 
tests, this study runs the Durbin-Watson (DW) test for autocorrelation. Next, the lever-
age models for all the combinations of two sectors are estimated to see whether there are 
any differences between the regressions for any two sectors or not. If no differences are 
found, then the data from the two sectors can be pooled together without any consid-
eration being made for differing intercept or slope, and with no parameter restrictions. 
In order to test whether there is contemporaneous correlation for the system of 
equations, this study tests the following null and alternative hypotheses:
H0: cov (ε1t , ε2t ) = 0 (2)
H1: cov (ε1t , ε2t ) ≠ 0
The Breusch-Pagan LM test is adopted to test these hypotheses. The Breusch-Pagan 
LM test-statistic is as follows:
LM test-statistic = r2 × T (3)
6 González and González (2012) investigate the influence of firm size on capital structure and demonstrate 
that there are variations in the importance of the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory in explaining 
the capital structure choices among large, medium-sized, and small firms in Spain. Precisely, the authors find 
that small firms tend to follow the predictions of the pecking order theory. Nonetheless, there are no notable 
differences among large, medium-sized, and small firms in their speed of adjustment to the target leverage ratio 
as postulated by the trade-off theory.
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where r2 is the squared correlation residuals between equations, and the residuals are 
estimated from the OLS regression, while T is the total pooled observations. The LM 
test-statistic follows the Chi-square distribution, χ2 [m (m – 1)/2] with [m (m – 1)/2] 
degrees of freedom, and m denotes the number of sectors.
In order to examine whether the estimate coefficient between any two sectors, e.g., 
Sector 1 and Sector 2, is equal, this study tests the following null and alternative hy-
potheses:
H0: ߚመଶǡௌா஼்ைோଵ = ߚመଶǡௌா஼்ைோଶ                       (4) 
H1: ߚመଶǡௌா஼்ைோଵ ≠ ߚመଶǡௌா஼்ைோଶ 
 
                                                                                                 (4)
The Wald test is applied to test these hypotheses. The same steps are repeated for the 
remaining parameters, i.e., . ߚመଷ, ߚመସ and ߚመହ. 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
This study sources annual financial and accounting data on firms listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia Main Market from the firms’ annual reports and audited financial statements. 
The analysis covers firms from seven sectors according to Bursa Malaysia’s classifica-
tion, namely consumer products, industrial products, construction, trading services, 
properties, plantation, and technology from 2000 to 2014, yielding a balanced panel 
dataset of 105 sector-year observations. The financial and utility sectors are excluded 
from the analysis due to the influence of regulatory concerns on their capital structure 
decisions.7
TABLE 1A. Descriptive statistics for the full sample
LEV PROFIT TANGI GROWTH SIZE
Sector-Year Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
105
0.437
0.351
0.110
2.984
105
0.057
0.067
-0.311
0.360
105
0.276
0.137
0.084
1.242
105
1.189
0.597
0.591
3.877
105
8.822
0.428
8.256
9.717
Table 1A shows the descriptive statistics for all sectors for the overall period, while 
Table 1B shows the averages of the firm-specific variables by sector across 2000 to 2014. 
The average leverage for all sectors is 0.437, with a standard deviation of 0.351. It can 
also be observed that the leverage ratios vary significantly across sectors, which is in line 
7 Put differently, the capital structures of these sectors are ascertained by capital requirements, which may differ 
from firms in the remaining sectors (Bhaird & Lucey, 2010). It is customary for capital structure studies to 
exclude these firms (e.g., Nugroho & Suk, 2019; Ebrahim et al., 2014).
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with prior research such as Li and Islam (2019). For instance, the industrial products 
sector records the lowest average leverage ratio of 0.255, while the trading services sec-
tor charts the highest average leverage ratio of 0.613. Meanwhile, the average profitabil-
ity for all sectors is 0.057, with a standard deviation of 0.067. The properties sector has 
the lowest average profitability of 0.029, while the consumer products sector records 
the highest average profitability of 0.096. In addition, the average asset tangibility for 
all sectors is 0.276, with a standard deviation of 0.137. This paper finds that the con-
struction sector has the lowest average asset tangibility of 0.132, while the industrial 
products sector has the highest average asset tangibility of 0.373. The average growth 
opportunities for all sectors is 1.189, with a standard deviation of 0.597. On average, 
firms in the technology sector have the highest growth opportunities of 1.729, while 
firms in the properties sector have the lowest growth opportunities of 0.727. Lastly, 
the average firm size for all sectors is 8.822, with a standard deviation of 0.428. Firms in 
the trading services sector tend to be relatively large in size, with a mean value of 9.505, 
while the consumer products sector records the lowest mean value of firm size of 8.415. 
5. Empirical Results
Table 2 reports the estimation results using both the OLS and SUR estimators. When 
the leverage model is estimated using the OLS estimator, the signs of the variables indi-
cate support for both the trade-off and the pecking order theories, thus confirming this 
study’s hypothesis that both theories are complementary. 
In particular, this study finds that profitability is negatively related to leverage at the 1% 
significance level, which supports the pecking order theory. This indicates that more prof-
itable firms prefer less leverage and rely more on retained earnings due to adverse selec-
tion and information asymmetry problems. Among empirical studies that find evidence 
in line with the pecking order theory are Li and Islam (2019) and Ebrahim et al. (2014).
Meanwhile, the association between leverage and asset tangibility is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, which supports the trade-off theory. Higher asset 
TABLE 1B. Descriptive statistics (mean) by sectors
Sector LEV PROFIT TANGI GROWTH SIZE
Consumer Products 
Industrial Products
Construction
Trading Services
Properties
Plantation
Technology
0.372
0.255
0.546
0.613
0.464
0.361
0.451
0.096
0.075
0.041
0.037
0.029
0.075
0.043
0.362
0.373
0.132
0.264
0.200
0.365
0.233
1.526
0.876
0.841
1.362
0.727
1.266
1.729
8.415
8.544
8.542
9.505
9.063
9.286
8.623
Notes: LEV = Book leverage ratio; PROFIT = Profitability; TANGI = Asset tangibility; GROWTH = 
Growth opportunities; SIZE = Firm size. All variables are averaged over the period 2000 to 2014.
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tangibility means that firms possess more fixed assets that can be given as collateral 
for loans. As such, lenders face lower risk when giving loans to these firms. Moreover, 
asset tangibility makes it more difficult for shareholders to substitute high-risk assets 
for low-risk ones. As a result, firms with more tangible assets can obtain debt financing 
with greater ease. Among empirical findings that support the trade-off theory are Li and 
Islam (2019), Chow et al. (2018), and Ebrahim et al. (2014). 
The coefficient for growth opportunities is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level, thus supporting the pecking order theory. This indicates that higher financing 
needs arise due to investment opportunities, and this will lead to more debt issuance. 
Among empirical studies that find evidence in line with the pecking order theory are 
Ebrahim et al. (2014), and González and González (2012). 
Lastly, the coefficient for firm size is positive and statistically significant at the 10% 
level, which lends support to the trade-off theory. This indicates that larger firms can 
obtain more debt financing since they are more diversified, have lower probability of 
going bankrupt, and possess greater bargaining power in the debt markets. This is also 
in accord with empirical findings by Li and Islam (2019), Chow et al. (2018), and Ebra-
him et al. (2014).
Next, using the SUR estimator, we estimate separate equations for each of the sev-
en sectors. As observed, the adjusted R2 improves tremendously from 0.654 under the 
OLS estimator to 0.956 under the SUR estimator, implying that the SUR model cap-
tures a higher proportion of variation in the leverage ratio that is predictable from the 
TABLE 2. OLS and SUR estimates for leverage determinants
OLS
SUR
Consumer
Products
Industrial
Products
Construc­
tion
Trading
Services Properties Plantation
Techno­
logy
PROFIT
TANGI
GROWTH
SIZE
Constant
-1.440***
(-4.099)
1.584***
(6.855)
0.222***
(4.683)
0.239*
(1.745)
-2.286*
(-1.940)
0.072
(0.655)
-0.756**
(-2.258)
0.058***
(2.731)
0.238***
(-2.666)
2.551***
(3.106)
-1.433***
(-3.520)
-0.398
(-1.473)
-0.004
(-0.073)
0.030
(0.228)
0.262
(1.157)
-0.456
(-1.232)
0.146
(0.598)
0.116
(1.093)
0.118**
(2.227)
-0.558
(-1.217)
-2.976***
(-5.684)
0.340
(0.232)
0.634***
(8.409)
0.397
(0.518)
-3.992
(-0.527)
-1.318***
(-2.840)
1.309***
(5.467)
0.126
(1.393)
0.349*
(1.828)
-3.016*
(-1.731)
0.146
(0.205)
1.461***
(9.660)
0.348***
(7.165)
-0.087
(-1.068)
0.173
(0.227)
0.268
(1.477)
-0.465*
(-1.743)
0.013
(1.127)
0.624***
(13.963)
-4.814***
(-12.680)
Obs.
F-value
Adj. R2
DW statistic
105
20.637***
0.654
1.904
105
66.930***
0.956
2.136
Notes: PROFIT = Profitability; TANGI = Asset tangibility; GROWTH = Growth opportunities; SIZE = 
Firm size. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics for book leverage regressions. Asterisks *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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regressors relative to the OLS model. The results also show that in some sectors, profita-
bility, asset tangibility, growth opportunities, and firm size have significant associations 
with leverage, but not all the time. Moreover, some of the signs of the variables have 
changed compared to those estimated using the OLS regression. 
In particular, for the consumer products sector, the results show that asset tangibil-
ity is negatively associated with leverage at the 5% level, which does not support the 
trade-off theory. There is, however, ambiguity regarding the relationship between as-
set tangibility and leverage under the pecking order theory. On one hand, firms with 
few tangible assets are expected to have more problems with information asymmetry. 
As such, these firms will tend to use more debt over time (Harris & Raviv, 1991). On 
the other hand, adverse selection problem increases with asset tangibility and results in 
higher leverage. Furthermore, consistent with the OLS estimation, both growth oppor-
tunities and firm size are positively associated with leverage at the 1% level. However, 
profitability is positively associated with leverage, but the relationship is not statistically 
significant.
For the industrial products sector, the results for profitability are similar to those of 
the OLS estimation. Nevertheless, asset tangibility and growth opportunities are neg-
atively related to leverage, but both relationships are not statistically significant, while 
firm size is positively associated with leverage but the relationship is not statistically 
significant, either. For the construction sector, only firm size is statistically significant 
and positively associated with leverage at the 5% level, which is in line with the OLS 
estimation. The remaining three variables are not statistically significant.
For the trading services sector, the results are similar to those of the OLS estimation 
except for asset tangibility and firm size, which are not statistically significant for the 
case of the SUR estimation. For the properties sector, the variables share the same signs 
with those of the OLS estimation, but growth opportunities is not a statistically signif-
icant variable under the SUR estimation. 
For the plantation sector, only asset tangibility and growth opportunities are posi-
tively associated with leverage at the 1% level, whereas profitability and firm size are not 
statistically significant. Lastly, for the technology sector, only firm size shares similar 
results to those of the OLS estimation. Asset tangibility is negatively associated with 
leverage at the 10% level, while profitability and growth opportunities are not statisti-
cally significant.
Next, this study estimates the leverage models for all the combinations of two sec-
tors to examine whether there are any differences between the regressions for any two 
sectors or not. Table 3 shows that in 17 out of 21 combinations between two sectors, 
the LM test-statistics are statistically significant. Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected, 
indicating that there is contemporaneous correlation for the system of equations. In 
these 17 cases, the SUR estimator is a more efficient estimator for the regression mod-
els. Meanwhile, for the remaining four combinations, i.e., between consumer products 
and construction, consumer products and trading services, consumer products and 
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properties, and properties and technology, the results are not statistically significant. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is not rejected, indicating that there is no contemporane-
ous correlation for the system of equations. In these four cases, the OLS estimator is a 
more efficient estimator for the regression models.
TABLE 3. Results of the Breusch-Pagan LM test and the Wald test
Sectors LM test­stat 
Wald Test (Chi­square)
PROFIT TANGI GROWTH SIZE
Industrial/Consumer 
Industrial/Construction
Industrial/Trading
Industrial/Properties
Industrial/Plantation
Industrial/Technology 
Consumer/Construction
Consumer/Trading
Consumer/Properties
Consumer/Plantation
Consumer/Technology
Construction/Trading
Construction/Properties
Construction/Plantation
Construction/Technology
Trading/Properties
Trading/Plantation
Trading/Technology
Properties/Plantation
Properties/Technology
Plantation/Technology 
 6.139**
19.379***
7.698***
18.884***
5.203**
8.466***
0.275
1.948
0.951
6.292**
17.545***
5.153**
24.480***
13.715***
3.128*
4.440**
19.011***
12.711***
12.096***
1.084
10.252***
11.180***
2.997*
3.311*
0.272
0.398
10.438***
1.146
24.395***
5.806**
0.002
1.642
16.058***
1.177
0.066
3.195*
5.829**
5.200**
34.807*** 
1.004
1.765
0.153
0.319
2.423
0.046
24.275***
32.585***
0.000
3.354*
0.196
26.206***
30.979
0.150
0.047
12.480***
14.337***
1.434
1.263
0.479
0.004
0.055
21.951***
16.486***
1.389
0.370
32.671***
1.508
13.945***
0.697
0.013
36.881***
0.522
14.609
1.925
10.095***
0.914
3.656*
0.144
7.893***
10.563***
54.580***
1.006
3.528*
27.245***
2.083
0.266
0.010
4.534**
0.006
20.775***
10.044**
0.058
10.625***
1.126
60.064***
0.022
3.565*
3.474*
44.300***
0.383
0.026
0.679
7.683***
1.020
38.755***
Notes: PROFIT = Profitability; TANGI = Asset tangibility; GROWTH = Growth opportunities; SIZE = 
Firm size. Asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
However, the results based on the Wald test are mixed. Only certain test results are 
statistically significant, hence allowing the null hypothesis to be rejected. In these cases, 
it can be concluded that based on the Wald test, the estimate coefficients between the 
two sectors are not equal, and the SUR estimator is a more efficient estimator for the 
regression models. Meanwhile, some test results are not statistically significant, and in 
such cases, the null hypothesis is not rejected. This indicates that for these cases, the es-
timate coefficients between the two sectors are equal, and the OLS estimator is a more 
efficient estimator for the regression models. Of particular interest is the combination 
between consumer products and plantation, where the test results for all four coeffi-
cients are insignificant.
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6. Robustness Checks
As a robustness check, this study includes another variable, namely business risk, into 
the regression model. Following Shanmugasundaram (2008) and Mazur (2007), busi-
ness risk is proxied by the standard deviation of the firm’s operating income scaled by 
the firm’s total assets over the study period. The regressions using both the OLS and 
SUR models are re-run, and the results are reported in Table 4. As observed, the inclu-
sion of business risk as an additional regressor does not significantly change the results, 
where the results remain qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2. Hence, this 
study concludes that business risk is not a significant variable, and the regression mod-
els remain robust.
TABLE 4. OLS and SUR estimates for leverage determinants (including business risk as an 
additional regressor)
OLS
SUR
Consumer
Products
Industrial
Products
Construc­
tion
Trading
Services
Proper­
ties
Planta­
tion Technology
PROFIT
TANGI
GROWTH
SIZE
BUSINESS
RISK
Constant
-1.414***
(-4.014)
1.576***
(6.814)
0.229***
(4.780)
0.243*
(1.774)
0.011
(1.009)
-2.333*
(-1.978)
-0.528*
(0.655)
-1.025**
(-3.406)
0.074***
(3.753)
0.051
(-1.149)
0.154***
(2.804)
1.553*
(1.914)
-1.466***
(-3.672)
-0.523*
(-1.899)
-0.007
(-0.130)
0.191
(1.121)
0.975
(1.724)
-1.132
(-0.747)
-0.531
(-1.454)
-0.005
(-0.023)
0.148
(1.360)
0.051
(0.923)
-0.739*
(-1.774)
0.046
(0.096)
-2.617***
(-6.669)
1.625
(1.370)
0.704***
(11.997)
1.061
(1.665)
0.027***
(3.812)
-10.782
(-1.709)
-1.680***
(-3.832)
1.427***
(6.065)
0.155
(1.652)
0.457*
(2.404)
0.127
(0.166)
-4.009
(-2.307)
-0.262
(-0.293)
1.418***
(6.238)
0.351***
(6.945)
-0.100
(-1.079)
0.127
(0.166)
0.333
(0.386)
0.385**
(1.999)
-0.588*
(-2.176)
0.012
(0.943)
0.659***
(13.349)
0.228
(0.745)
-5.097***
(-12.447)
Obs.
F-value
Adj. R2
DW statistic
105
18.858***
0.654
1.893
105
66.074***
0.962
1.822
Notes: PROFIT = Profitability; TANGI = Asset tangibility; GROWTH = Growth opportunities; SIZE = 
Firm size; BUSINESS RISK = Business risk. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics for book leverage regres-
sions. Asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
7. Conclusion
This study examines the determinants of corporate capital structure of various sectors 
in the Bursa Malaysia Main Market with the objective to establish whether the determi-
nants of capital structure can be explained by either the trade-off or the pecking order 
theory. This research also investigates whether there are any differences between the 
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regressions for any two sectors or not. This paper applies both the OLS and SUR esti-
mators to estimate the leverage models and subsequently determines the efficiency of 
each estimator. 
The results reveal that profitability, asset tangibility, growth opportunities, and firm 
size are important determinants of corporate capital structure. However, the signs of 
the regression coefficients suggest that the trade-off and the pecking order theories are 
complementary. Moreover, the importance of some of these determinants differs across 
sectors. In most cases of the regression analyses between two sectors, the SUR estima-
tor is found to be more efficient in explaining the capital structure determinants among 
the various sectors as indicated by the Breusch-Pagan LM test. Hence, this paper con-
cludes that the SUR method could serve as a useful alternative methodology for capital 
structure research. 
Several limitations of this study need to be highlighted. First, this study is only con-
fined to firm-specific variables. Future research may extend this study to include oth-
er factors such as macroeconomic variables and institutional factors, especially when 
dealing with multi-country analysis. Second, this study did not account for the possible 
effects of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. As such, future research may consider 
incorporating structural breaks into the regression models.
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